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Agents or Stewards? Contracting with
Voluntary Organisations
Jo Cribb
Introduction
In order to escape a violent partner, take a disabled child
swimming, get information about government services
or extinguish a rural house fire, New Zealanders will
generally interact with a voluntary organisation. In many
areas of government voluntary organisations play an
important delivery and operational role. A modest
estimate (based on data from only 14 government
departments) suggests that at least $650 million of
public social services are delivered each year by voluntary
organisations via government contracts (Community
and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).
Agency theory was a foundational component in the
design of New Zealand’s state sector reforms in the 1980s
and 90s. It has been strongly influential in shaping the
contractually-based working relationship between
government agencies as providers of funding for services
and the community organisations that deliver those
services on their behalf. Contracting between
government agencies and voluntary organisations can,
however, be fraught (Office of the Auditor General,
2003). Officials often find specifying what they wish to
be delivered in the prescribed manner for contracts a
challenge. Contract outputs risk becoming checklists
for delivery and, as such, are not linked to the
effectiveness of the service or outcome desired and create
opportunities for ‘creaming’ the ‘easiest’ clients and tasks.
From a voluntary sector perspective, small organisations
often find the compliance costs of reporting onerous.
As a result, newly-established voluntary organisations
that provide services addressing emerging needs (such
as those of refugee communities) can be excluded from
funding and contracting processes.
This article, which derives from the author’s doctoral
research at Victoria University of Wellington’s School
of Government (Cribb, 2005), raises questions about
the assumptions on which the current contracting
system is based. It suggests that better outcomes may
be achieved by a more discriminating application of
agency theory in the design of contractual relationships
between government agencies and community
organisations, and by the application of an alternative
model - one founded on stewardship theory.
The agency basis of current contracting
practice
Voluntary organisations have existed in New Zealand
since the beginning of colonisation. Scholars conclude
that they have been dependent on state funding since
the earliest years of organised government. Prior to the
1990s, the most common method of state funding for
voluntary organisations was a system of grants and
subsidies not usually attached to specific services. The
early 1990s, a time of rising fiscal debt, saw a rethink of
what was the appropriate size and function of the state.
New Zealand’s public management system, drawing on
economic and administrative theories, was restructured
(Boston et al., 1996). Several aspects of the restructuring
altered how government agencies approached their
relationship with voluntary organisations. In particular,
based on insights from agency theory, the assumptions
government agencies made about voluntary
organisations changed.
For agency theorists, social and political life can be
understood as a series of contracts. Principals delegate
tasks, using contracts, to agents. Agents undertake work
on principals’ behalf in return for rewards. The focus of
the theory is the contract governing the relationship
between principal and agent and determining how the
contract can be made as efficient as possible (Eisenhardt,
1989). Agency theorists interpret broadly what
constitutes a contract. Contracts may be ‘classical’: arm’s-
length, formal and explicit. They may also be ‘relational’:
implicit, open-ended, incomplete and based on
obligations (Boston et al., 1996).
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Two problems can arise from contractual relationships:
goal conflict, as the goals of the agents and their principals
are usually different (Eisenhardt, 1989); and information
asymmetry, as the agent often has more information than
the principal about the task at hand. Under such
conditions, it is difficult and expensive for the principal
to verify what the agent is doing. The focus of agency
theorists is on minimising the impact of these problems
for the principal.
Agency theory, drawing on its neo-classical economic
roots, assumes that individuals are ‘rational, self-
interested utility maximisers’. As such, the interests of
the principal and agent are bound to conflict because
each party is assumed to be trying to maximise its
personal benefits (Eisenhardt, 1989). Even if principals
and agents have similar goals, assumptions about the
nature of individuals leads to the conclusion that agents
will shirk by producing outputs at a higher cost than
required or producing outputs of a lower quality than
specified. This is termed moral hazard: a lack of effort
on the part of the agent. Agents may also claim that
they have skills and capacity to deliver that they actually
do not. Adverse selection may occur as principals contract
with agents who have misrepresented their abilities
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
Principals have a number of options available to them
to minimise the risk of their agents shirking, cheating
or operating with guile. They can provide incentives
for the agent to operate according to the principal’s
wishes, monitor the agent’s actions to ensure they are
doing so, and sanction the agent if their performance is
not satisfactory.
Agency theory was influential in the restructuring of a
number of relationships within the public service.
Purchase agreements between ministers and chief
executives for the purchase of services from government
departments were introduced, as were performance
agreements between chief executives and the State Services
Commissioner. The contract model was also applied to
the relationship between government agencies and
voluntary organisations. The Treasury was a powerhouse
of the state sector restructuring. Briefings written towards
the end of the restructuring period showed that Treasury
officials were concerned about the quality of services
delivered by voluntary organisations. Government, the
papers concluded, needed to be vigilant about regulating
and monitoring voluntary organisations’ delivery to
reduce information asymmetries and ensure they did not
shirk. The development of contracting policies and
practices was based on such assumptions (New Zealand
Treasury, 1995).
Grant-based funding ceased for many voluntary
organisations in the early 1990s and was replaced with
contracts for the delivery of services. Government
agencies attempted to specify what services they
required, introduce monitoring regimes, and sanction
poorly performing organisations by not renewing their
contracts. Clear objectives in contracts were designed
to ensure voluntary organisation providers focused on
results. Reporting on the objectives would provide good
information to government agencies about the provider
and the quality of the service (Boston et al., 1996).
Overlaying the introduction of contracting was the
pressure to reduce government spending. Competition
between providers was encouraged. Voluntary
organisations were often required to tender. Market
pressures were sought to ensure efficiency of service
delivery. A drive to increase transparency and
accountability was also an important aspect of the
restructuring. Accountability was interpreted as
answerability and took the form of formal reporting
against specified measures (Mulgan, 2003). Enhanced
accountability was seen as a way of developing more
efficient and effective organisations and service delivery.
By the mid-1990s, voluntary organisations with a
funding relationship with government had become
service providers. Many had a formal, ‘classical’ contract
with government. What they were required to provide,
in what quantity, at what quality and price - all this was
specified in the contract.
Voluntary organisations’ experience of
contracting
The great majority of voluntary sector managers and
board members surveyed in my doctoral research, which
focused on four community organisations of differing
types, focused their attention on their relationships with
their clients. They felt they were most accountable to
their clients for the quality of the services they provided.
They generally identified their relationship with
government as a hindrance. Contracting and funding
agreements with government agencies were seen to be
driving down standards of care. Poorly designed
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programmes, irrelevant performance measures and a
piecemeal approach to service provision were seen to
detract from the quality of service they could provide
to their clients.
Respondents’ perceptions of how they were viewed and
treated by government officials were uniform. They felt
that officials treated them as ‘poor cousins’. They
perceived that their skills were not recognised, their ideas
and suggestions not valued and their concerns not
considered valid. And they perceived that they were
being treated as agents, while, on the other hand, officials
were operating as if they were principals
More specifically, respondents perceived that:
* They were viewed as inferior, while officials saw
themselves as experts. There was no negotiation or
dialogue about the contents of the contract or
funding agreement. (Agency theory assumes that the
principal has a superior position in regard to the
agent and will work to maintain the power
imbalance. Indeed, principals enact mechanisms to
control agents – such as financial incentives and
monitoring regimes – and ensure power
asymmetries.)
* Officials did not trust them. They expected the
respondents to try to defraud the system or produce
poor quality work. The integrity and expertise of
respondents was not recognised. (One of the key tenets
of agency theory is the assumption that agents have
different interests from those of the principal and will
seek to better themselves at the principal’s expense.)
* The main form of communication between
respondents and officials was monitoring reports.
The relationship was distant and paper-based.
(Agency theory promotes external monitoring as a
mechanism to control age
* Reporting focused on specific outputs that were
often irrelevant to service quality or organisational
performance. (Detailed pre-specification of
contracts is another tool agency theorists promote
to control agents.)
* Contracting was an economic tool used to try to
maximise efficiency. Respondents perceived that
officials took a ‘take it or leave it’ approach focused
on competition between providers to drive down the
price of service delivery.
Are the assumptions of agency theory
valid?
At its core, agency theory predicts that agents will have
different aims from their government funders (the
principals), that they will operate opportunistically and
with guile to achieve their own aims, and that they will
shirk as much as possible. In this research it was found,
however, that respondents had similar high-level goals
to officials. Officials and respondents both aimed to
achieve positive outcomes for recipients of their services.
Respondents saw that their primary accountability
obligation was to their clients, and they perceived
themselves to be going the ‘extra mile’ at their own
expense to fulfil it. They saw themselves working for
clients in the face of barriers created by the contracting
process. Rather than shirking by attempting to provide
less service than required, as agency theory predicted
they would do, respondents were actively fund-raising
to increase levels of service provision, independently of
the funding provided by government officials.
International studies have drawn similar conclusions.
For example, Rasmussen et al.’s 2003 study found that
government officials and voluntary sector managers
shared a client focus. Indeed, agency theorists have
similarly come to accept that the assumption of goal
conflict may not always be valid. Eisenhardt (1989)
concedes that goal alignment may occur in highly
socialised or clan-orientated firms, or in situations where
self-interest gives way to selfless behaviour. As goal
conflict decreases, so does the need for in-depth
monitoring. Agents will behave in a manner acceptable
to the principal regardless of the level of monitoring.
Agents or stewards?
It may be timely to consider an alternative approach.
Stewardship theory takes as its starting point the
assumption of goal alignment, and is increasingly seen
as an important framework for structuring relationships
(Block, 1996).
The origins of the concept of stewardship are biblical.
Stewards, as valued employees who are entrusted with
running households, are mentioned in both the Old
and New Testaments. Stewards were seen as servants of
someone or something greater than themselves, were
committed to their work, and had the discretion to take
risks on behalf of their masters.
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Proponents of stewardship theory argue that pro-
organisational and collective behaviours are of higher
utility than the individualistic, self-serving behaviours
assumed by agency theory (Dicke and Ott, 2002). Put
simply, if the organisation does well, its members will
do well, so they invest their energy in their organisation’s
success (Davis et al., 1997). People will thus put the
organisation’s needs first. They are not assumed to want
to shirk or act opportunistically, as agency theory has
it. Instead, they are motivated to work to achieve the
organisation’s goals (Block, 1996).
Stewards, like others, have basic survival needs, such as
a regular salary. The differences between a self-interested
agent and a steward are in how these survival needs are
met. Stewards realise that there is a trade-off between
personal and organisational needs, and choose to work
for organisational needs. By doing so, stewards assume
their personal needs will be met (Davis et al., 1997).
Some theorists acknowledge that stewards may work
for altruistic reasons – unselfish concern and devotion
to others – without expected return. Dicke and Ott
(2000) argue that altruistic motives best explain
voluntary organisations and their employees, as
employees are selected and socialised to care about and
serve clients.
Less controlling organisation structures and mechanisms
are needed for stewards. Extending the autonomy of
stewards maximises the benefits of their behaviour.
Informal and intrinsic accountability mechanisms,
rather than ‘hard’ legalistic or mechanistic ones, are best
suited to stewards: the promulgation of professional
standards, peer review, and mechanisms that build a
sense of internal responsibility (Dicke and Ott, 2000).
Control can be counter-productive because it signals
that the steward is not trusted with a level of discretion.
Such control will lower the motivation of a steward to
work for the organisation (Davis et al., 1997).
If a stewardship approach were to be adopted to guide
the government-voluntary sector contracting
relationship, a number of changes would occur.
Stewardship theorists would see current accountability
mechanisms, such as monitoring, audit and reporting,
as superficial. They would instead focus on ensuring
that goals are shared. This would mean government
agencies would take the time to understand what the
voluntary organisations were trying to achieve, how they
were doing it and where there was a congruence of goals.
When it had been identified that goals were shared, the
contracting process could begin. There would be a large
investment of time at the beginning of any relationship.
If, after discussions with a voluntary organisation, it were
clear that the organisation had different goals from those
the officials were trying to achieve (or that it was not
capable of delivering what was required), officials would
seek another provider. In practice, this might mean that
organisations currently contracting with government
would not be offered future contracts: a potentially
difficult and politically volatile situation.
Once a relationship had been established, voluntary
organisations would be trusted to get on with the job.
Performance measures focusing on measuring outcomes
for clients would be jointly developed over time. Blanket
controls and ‘boilerplate’ contracts would not be used.
Non-financial motivations would be acknowledged.
Knowledge generated from the performance measures
would be used to modify service delivery. Dialogue
between parties would focus on delivery problems, and
potential improvements or innovations. The
information asymmetries that are problematic in
principal-agent relationships would still exist: the staff
of voluntary organisations have more information about
service delivery than officials. Under a stewardship
framework, such asymmetries would not be seen as a
potential source of risk for principals (such as an avenue
for inflating contract prices), but rather such knowledge
would be seen as expertise that should be incorporated
into policy processes.
The additional time made available to officials by the
reduction of detailed monitoring of contracts could be
used by them to provide long-term strategic guidance,
and research on effective service delivery and the
attainment of outcomes. The stewards (voluntary
organisations) would be freed from detailed reporting
and the provision of government-designed piecemeal
programmes to do what they do best – that is, deliver
in-depth services to clients. The principals (officials)
could support this through research, development and
investment in strategy.
Officials could choose to contract better with fewer
organisations, given the resource-intensive nature of
establishing relationships. This would not be without
risk for the voluntary sector. Fewer organisations might
receive funding. A trusted ‘inner circle’ could develop.
Under such circumstances, new organisations might be
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excluded. Organisations receiving funding could also
find it difficult to maintain their unique qualities as
they developed a close relationship with government,
as predicted by neo-institutionalists (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983).
Of benefit to the voluntary sector, however, would be
the increased investment government agencies could
make in building the capacity of voluntary organisations.
In particular, officials might seek to improve the ability
of voluntary organisations to monitor how well they
are doing in fulfilling their mission, so that they could
self-regulate. Evidence indicates that these organisations
have little capacity to monitor closely their own
performance.
A number of conditions would need to be met if
stewardship theory were to effectively govern the
government-voluntary sector relationship. Voluntary
organisations would need sophisticated systems of
performance management and self-criticism to ensure
that they were working towards the shared goals. This
author’s research and other studies have found that
internal performance measurement is a weakness, and
that the level of self-regulation needed to ensure that
such organisations are working to enhance the public
good is not present.
Both parties need to be interested in each other and looking
for better ways to serve the public (that is, to have an
effective focus on outcomes). The author found that most
respondents believed that officials had little interest in them
and that the contracting process was mainly about
delivering outputs for clients rather than outcomes.
Government needs to recognise that it puts up cultural
barriers to working with voluntary organisations. The
report of the Community and Voluntary Sector Working
Party (2001) provided specific examples of such barriers
operating in the New Zealand context. These included
the speed at which policy makers expect the voluntary
sector to respond to draft documents. A number of
organisations reported that they were unable to
participate in policy processes in a meaningful way.
Umbrella organisations, which seek feedback from their
constituencies before engaging with government
agencies, saw themselves particularly hampered by the
short timeframes allowed. The speed and demands of
the political cycle provide one example of a cultural
barrier for voluntary organisations that prioritise
discussion and consensus.
Moreover, government agencies need to be prepared to
share decision making. For the Community and
Voluntary Sector Working Party, this meant providing
genuine opportunities for organisations to comment on
policy and involvement in the early stages of policy
development. Respondents’ perceptions of the
contracting process as a ‘take it or leave it’ one suggest
that this is still a long way off.
Time is also needed to develop shared expectations and
sensible performance measures. Experimentation will
be needed. However, as demonstrated by the example
of a contract in the recent Auditor General’s report on
the government contracting processes, practices
currently do not result in shared expectations:
There was no ‘meeting of minds’ on the part of the
Ministry and [the voluntary organisation it
contracted with] as to the length and expected
outcomes of the contract. The parties were confused
over the length of the contract and the expected
outcomes during the term of the contract. (Office
of the Auditor General, 2003, p.59)
The way forward?
In theory, adopting a stewardship rather than an agency-
theory frame may address many of the limitations of
the current contracting regime. However, the reality is
much more complex.
Stewardship theory is untested, particularly in voluntary
sector research, and the enthusiasm with which some
of its proponents advocate this approach makes their
claims seem too good to be true. As Arthurs and Busentiz
(2003, p.155) argue, ‘stewardship theory paints an
excessively rosy picture of the steward’.
Government agencies need to make voluntary
organisations accountable for taxpayers’ money.
They need to be seen to be in control (Dicke, 2002).
As guardians of the public purse, public agencies
take what can be considered a risk-averse approach.
The mechanisms of external control, such as
monitoring and reporting, can be seen to provide
the needed assurance to both ministers and the
public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively
(Davis et al., 1997). Being accountable for taxpayers’
dollars is one example of the different set of pressures
that officials as opposed to voluntary organisations
operate under.
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Another pressure originates from the three-year
political cycle and the associated changes in policy
and programmes. Such change will make it difficult
for officials to establish committed long-term
relationships with voluntary organisations. A regime
built on the assumption that providers should be
allowed a high level of discretion is unlikely to be
feasible in this context. Public accountability systems
can be seen as a trade-off between discretion and
assumed innovation and efficiency, on one hand, and
the need for control on the other. Increased control
comes at an increased cost: the resources needed to
monitor behaviour, as well as reduced levels of
innovation and the performance improvements that
can result from such innovation.
At the heart of the debate is the issue of how much
discretion agencies can allow their providers: how far
can they trust them? Finding the balance between control
and trust is the key question for any alliance, and there
are no easy and obvious answers. Both come at a cost to
the organisations involved. For a relationship based on
trust to develop, government agencies and voluntary
organisations will need to become familiar with each
other. Trusting relationships are only formed between
actors who have established close bonds. The interests
of the parties must be aligned. As previous discussions
of agency theory have shown, when each party is self-
interested and working towards different goals, control
becomes a central feature of the relationship, at the
expense of, or as a substitute for, trust (de Leon, 2003).
For trust to develop in a relationship a sense of shared
higher-level purpose is needed. Trust is also most likely
to eventuate when parties have taken care and time in
choosing their partners.
However, in trusting voluntary organisations,
government agencies will be implicitly accepting the risks
associated with being dependent on them for the delivery
of services. Trust implicitly involves loosening
mechanisms of control, and relying on voluntary
organisations to deliver services of an acceptable quality.
Such interdependence increases the vulnerability of
government agencies (particularly to poor performance
by voluntary organisations) and increases the potential
for betrayal or harm from voluntary organisations (such
as the potential for being defrauded). Understandably,
such risk is not readily acceptable to either public sector
managers or politicians.
In sum, stewardship theory is based on assumptions that
may portray more accurately than does agency theory
the government-voluntary sector contracting experience.
But it is certainly not to be regarded as any sort of
panacea, and if it were to be applied as slavishly as agency
theory was in the late 1980s and early 90s, it too would
give rise to all sorts of unintended, and often undesirable,
consequences. The least that can be said is that, given
the importance of the contracting relationship for the
delivery of public services, there needs to be much more
exploration of the validity of the assumptions upon
which government agencies and voluntary organisations
enter into contractual relationships.
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